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Celebrities’ Expansive “Right of Publicity” Infringes upon Advertisers’ First Amendment Rights 
By: Jonathan Siderits 
I. Introduction 
 In April 2014, television and movie actress Katherine Heigl was photographed by 
paparazzi as she exited a Duane Reade drugstore in downtown New York, shopping bags in 
hand.1 The company seized the opportunity to promote its brand by publishing the photograph on 
its Twitter and Facebook accounts, each captioned with “Love a quick #DuaneReade run? Even 
@KatieHeigl can't resist shopping #NYC's favorite [most convenient] drugstore.”2 Heigl 
responded in a manner that Duane Reade likely did not expect—she sued the company for, 
among other things, violating her right of publicity under New York state law, seeking damages 
of no less than $6 million.3  
 In her complaint, Heigl expressed her strenuous objection to Duane Reade “exploit[ing] 
[her] image for commercial gain,” claiming that she had suffered “substantial” harm.4 In 
particular, Heigl asserted that her “picture, image, and likeness enjoy wide-spread recognition 
and monetary value” by virtue of her celebrity status, and that she has carefully protected her 
name and persona from unauthorized exploitation by advertisers.5 As she puts it, “when [she] 
chooses to endorse a product or service, she is highly selective and well compensated.”6 Duane 
                                                          
1 Emily Yahr, Can Katherine Heigl really sue Duane Reade for tweeting her photo? Yes, and here’s why., The 
Washington Post (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/style-blog/wp/2014/04/11/can-katherine-
heigl-really-sue-duane-reade-for-tweeting-her-photo-yes-and-heres-why/. 
2 Id.  
3 Id.  
4 Heigl v. Duane Reade, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-02502 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), ECF No. 2, Complaint at 1. 
5 Id. at 4. 
6 Id. at 4. 
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Reade, however, had not sought or obtained her permission prior to publishing the photograph to 
promote its stores.7  
 Although Heigl v. Duane Reade, Inc. was ultimately settled out of court in August 2014, 
with Duane Reade allegedly making a sizable contribution to Heigl’s charity foundation, the case 
illustrates the expansive nature of celebrities’ so-called “right of publicity” and its impact on the 
First Amendment rights of advertisers, as well as its effect on the general public.8 The right of 
publicity should not be a viable cause of action against an advertiser who uses a celebrity's name 
or likeness, or otherwise appropriates the celebrity’s identity to promote a product, so long as the 
advertiser does not falsely imply that the celebrity approves of, or endorses, the product. 
II. Background 
A. Regulation of Commercial Speech 
In 1976, the Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council criticized the paternalistic, overprotective nature of the commercial speech 
doctrine.9 Prior to Virginia State Board, the commercial speech doctrine had allowed practically 
unbridled legislative regulation of commercial speech, which was viewed as having little value 
with little or no recognition of any First Amendment protection, since the days of Valentine v. 
Chrestensen.10 But now, the Supreme Court has recognized that different people value different 
speech differently, and that consumers and society in general have a strong interest in the “free 
                                                          
7 Id. at 10. 
8 Nate Raymond, Katherine Heigl, Duane Reade end lawsuit over actress' photo, Reuters (Aug. 27, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/27/us-people-katherineheigl-idUSKBN0GR2BD20140827. 
9 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). 
10 See e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that, while states and municipalities may not 
unduly burden or proscribe the freedom to communicate information in public thoroughfares, “the Constitution 
imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising”).  
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flow of commercial information.”11 And, as Justice Blackmun stated in the majority opinion, the 
right to free speech is just as much about the “listener” as it is about the “speaker.”12    
Following Virginia State Board, in 1980 the Supreme Court decided the landmark 
commercial speech case Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. New York, which established 
the modern standard for government regulation of speech in the context of commercial 
advertising. Finding that commercial speech was valuable as a means of providing information to 
people to make informed decisions, the Court established a four-step analysis which asks: (1) is 
the expression protected by the First Amendment (i.e. concerning lawful activity and not 
misleading); (2) is the asserted governmental interest substantial; (3) does the regulation directly 
advance the asserted governmental interest; and (4) is the regulation more extensive than 
necessary to serve that interest?13 Essentially, a state can only regulate lawful commercial speech 
if it has a substantial interest for doing so and the regulation directly advances that interest in a 
manner no more extensive than necessary.14 In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun disagreed 
with the last three prongs of the Court’s new test, and instead believed the first prong to be 
dispositive; in his view, so long as the speech was lawful and not misleading, then the 
government’s only recourse might be to regulate the advertised product or service itself—not the 
commercial speech associated therewith.15  
 
 
                                                          
11 Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 763-764. 
12 Id. at 757. 
13 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). 
14 Id.  
15 See id. at 579. 
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B. Haelan Laboratories 
 The right of publicity was first recognized by the Second Circuit in Haelan Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. In Haelan, the court decided that “a man has a right in the 
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his 
picture.”16 According to the Haelan court, this “right of publicity” must be separate from the 
statute-created right of privacy, wherein one has “a personal and non-assignable right not to have 
his feelings hurt” by a publication of his own picture, because, as the court reasoned, celebrities 
would otherwise “feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing 
advertisements.”17 Indeed, the Haelan court recognized that this sense of deprivation would be 
“far from” any sense of bruised feelings on the part of the celebrity.18 In essence, the Haelan 
court recognized that there is pecuniary value in a person’s (and, in particular, a celebrity’s) 
endorsement of a product or service, and therefore created a new, common-law, intellectual 
property right for courts to protect that value. Notably, the emersion of the right of publicity 
occurred during the reign of the commercial speech doctrine, prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Virginia State Board or its creation of the Central Hudson test.    
C. Celebrity Impersonators 
 In the half-century since Haelan, the right of publicity has been recognized in the 
majority of states across the country, either by way of common law or codification in state 
statute.19 Moreover, the right has undergone significant expansion in the advertising context, 
                                                          
16 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). 
17 Id.  
18 Id. 
19 Notably, national advertisers must adhere to the strictest of the state laws in which they advertise, such that 
recognition of the right of publicity in the majority of states has the practical result of affecting advertisers’ 
decisions even in states where the right is not recognized.   
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reaching far beyond the use of a celebrity’s picture. For example, in Onassis v. Christian Dior-
New York, Inc., the court found that the New York right of publicity statute, which prohibited 
unauthorized appropriation of a person’s “portrait or picture” for advertising purposes, was 
violated by use of a celebrity “look-alike.”20 In Onassis, an advertiser sought to prepare a 
number of print ads featuring the famous Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, but knew that she would 
likely refuse to appear because she was historically known to never allow her name or image to 
be used to promote commercial products; the advertiser’s solution was to fill her role in the ad 
with the help of Barbara Reynolds, a celebrity impersonator of Onassis.21 The court ruled against 
the advertiser, holding that the statutory language “portrait or picture” extended beyond actual 
images of Onassis herself to include “any representation, including the picture of another, which 
was intended to be, and did, in fact, convey the idea that it was the plaintiff.”22 The court 
concluded that Reynolds may not use her resemblance to Onassis in commercial advertisements, 
adding that “[n]o one has an inherent or constitutional right to pass himself off for what he is 
not.”23 
 Shortly after the New York Supreme Court’s decision in Onassis, the Southern District of 
New York decided a similar case involving another celebrity look-alike.  In Allen v. National 
Video, Inc., the court clarified that, in analyzing a right of publicity claim against the use of a 
celebrity look-alike, “the question before the court is not whether some, or even most, people 
will be reminded of plaintiff when they see this advertisement . . . but whether an undisputed 
picture of [the look-alike] should be regarded, as a matter of law, to be a portrait or picture of 
                                                          
20 Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 257-258, 263 (Sup. Ct. 1984) aff'd, 488 N.Y.S.2d 
943 (App. Div. 1985). 
21 Id. at 257. 
22 Id. at 261. 
23 Id. at 262. 
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plaintiff.”24 While it found that the advertisement at issue, which included a photograph of 
Woody Allen look-alike Phil Boroff, certainly made reference to the celebrity plaintiff, the court 
identified several factors that weighed against granting summary judgment in his favor.25 These 
factors included several differing physical characteristics and alternative interpretations for the 
look-alike’s presence in the advertisement, and so the court declined to conclude that the 
photograph used in the advertisement was the celebrity’s portrait or picture as a matter of law.26 
Therefore, the court resolved the issue in the context of a Lanham Act false endorsement claim 
instead, ultimately finding in favor of the celebrity plaintiff and granting an injunction against 
the defendant advertiser.27  
Similarly, in Midler v. Ford Motor Co., an advertising agency sought out Grammy 
Award winner Bette Midler to sing her hit “Do You Want To Dance” for a television commercial 
promoting the Ford Lincoln Mercury.28 When Midler’s manager refused, the agency found a 
replacement in Ula Hedwig, a former Midler backup singer.29 After being instructed by the 
agency to record the song “sound[ing] as much as possible like…Bette Midler,” Hedwig imitated 
Midler as best she could.30 Ultimately, the Hedwig recording was used in the commercial, and 
many viewers believed that it “sounded exactly” like Midler’s distinctive recording.31 Even 
though the court found that the agency had not used Midler’s name, voice, likeness, or any other 
use prohibited by state statute, the court looked to the common law, wherein the state would 
                                                          
24 Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (emphases in original). 
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 630. 
28 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 462. 
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recognize an injury from “an appropriation of the attributes of one’s identity.”32 The court found 
that using Hedwig as a Midler “sound-alike” constituted such an appropriation, stating that “[t]o 
impersonate her voice is to pirate her identity.”33  
D. Right of Publicity vs. First Amendment 
Celebrities’ right of publicity has occasionally been trumped by the First Amendment. 
For example, in C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., the 
court recognized “an inherent tension between the right of publicity and the right of freedom of 
expression under the First Amendment.”34 The C.B.C. court balanced the competing interests at 
issue in a non-advertising setting: a fantasy sports game producer’s First Amendment right to use 
baseball players’ names and playing records versus the baseball players’ right of publicity.35 In 
conducting its analysis, the court identified each of the potential justifications for enforcing the 
right of publicity. First, the court noted that, in Zacchini v. Scripps, the Supreme Court had found 
that at least one goal of the right is to “focus [] on the right of the individual to reap the reward of 
his endeavors,” distinguishing between those cases in which a person’s name is used “for 
purposes of trade” and those which “go[] to the heart of [a person’s] ability to earn a living” and 
which involve “the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first 
place.”36 The C.B.C. court found that the game producer’s use of the players’ names and playing 
                                                          
32 Id. at 463. 
33 Id.  
34 C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1095 
(E.D. Mo. 2006) aff'd, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 1097 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broadcasting, Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977)). 
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records did not interfere with their ability to reap financial rewards from playing baseball and 
making product endorsements.37  
Next, the C.B.C. court analyzed the potential economic incentive for enforcing the 
players’ right of publicity. Quoting Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n38, 
the court found that the economic incentive of inducing achievement was “inconsequential 
because most celebrities with valuable commercial identities are already handsomely 
compensated . . . even without the right of publicity the rate of return to stardom in the 
entertainment and sports fields is probably high enough to bring forth a more than adequate 
supply of creative effort and achievement.”39 Moreover, the court noted that “even in the absence 
of publicity rights, celebrities would still be able to reap financial reward from authorized 
appearances and endorsements.”40 While the C.B.C. court clearly was not moved by this 
economic incentive, it noted that another economic incentive of promoting efficient allocation of 
resources might be more persuasive in an advertising context, “where repeated use of a 
celebrity’s likeness to sell products may eventually diminish its commercial value.”41 
The C.B.C. court also identified protection against consumer deception as a justification 
for the right of publicity, but noted that the Lanham Act already provides such protection.42 
Other possible justifications cited by the court included allowing the persons to enjoy the fruits 
of their goodwill and the prevention of unjust enrichment.43 Notably, the court found that the 
public’s countervailing “interest in the dissemination of news and information” outweighed any 
                                                          
37 Id. 
38 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir.1996). 
39 C.B.C., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1097 (internal quotations omitted). 
40 Id.  








of the baseball players’ interests.44 Specifically, the court found that the public had a substantial 
interest in “factual data” concerning baseball players and games.45 Therefore, the court held that, 
even if the players had a valid right of publicity in their names and records and the game 
producer was infringing that right, the right of publicity “must give way” to the producer’s First 
Amendment right.46   
E. White v. Samsung 
1. Panel Decision 
Perhaps the most expansive court decision involving a right of publicity was White v. 
Samsung Electronics America, Inc. At issue in White was a television commercial by Samsung 
that was designed to imply that its products would still be in use in the upcoming twenty-first 
century.47 Specifically, the commercial promoted Samsung’s video-cassette recorders (VCRs) 
and depicted a robot dressed similarly to “Wheel of Fortune” co-host Vanna White posing in 
front of a game board in a manner similar to White.48 The game board clearly resembled the 
“Wheel of Fortune” set, and the commercial’s caption read “Longest-running game show. 2012 
A.D.”49 The clear takeaway from the commercial was that, by the year 2012, Vanna White 
would be replaced by a robot in her role as co-host of the popular game show. White, whose 
permission was neither sought nor given prior to the commercial’s airing, was not amused. After 
losing to Samsung on summary judgment at the district court, White persuaded the Ninth Circuit 
                                                          
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 1099. 
46 Id. at 1100. 
47 White v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended (Aug. 19, 1992). 
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
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Court of Appeals to allow her to take her common law right of publicity claim to a jury—
ultimately receiving a $403,000 award.50 
In reversing the district court’s dismissal of White’s right of publicity claim, the Ninth 
Circuit declared that the common law right of publicity is not confined to appropriation of a 
person’s “name or likeness.”51 Rather, the court found that common law right of publicity 
protects a person’s “identity” in a broad sense, citing Midler, among others.52 In the court’s view, 
the only question is whether a defendant has appropriated the plaintiff’s identity, not how he has 
done so.53 And, in White’s case, the Samsung commercial left “little doubt about the celebrity 
the ad is meant to depict.”54 For the Ninth Circuit panel, this was enough for White to allege that 
Samsung had appropriated her identity. Moreover, the majority dismissed Samsung’s parody 
defense simply because the advertisement’s primary message was commercial in nature.55  
Notably, Circuit Judge Alarcon dissented from the majority’s conclusion that recovery 
under right of publicity is allowable merely if there is an appropriation of one’s identity. 
Specifically, Alarcon found that the authoritative cases all required proof of appropriation of a 
name or likeness, and that a case may only go to a jury when “identifying characteristics unique 
to a plaintiff are the only information as to the identity of the person appearing in an ad.”56 
Alarcon then concluded that “[n]o reasonable juror could confuse a metal robot with Vanna 
White.”57 Moreover, Alarcon pointed out that the “Wheel of Fortune” game board was the only 
                                                          
50 See Heberer, William M. III (1994) “The Overprotection of Celebrity: A Comment on White v. Samsung 
Electronics America, Inc.,” Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 22: Iss. 3, Article 10, at 6.  
51 Id. at 1397. 
52 Id. at 1398. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 1399. 
55 Id. at 1401. 
56 Id. at 1404. 
57 Id.  
10




part of the commercial that could lead a viewer to think of White, and that courts had never 
before granted any kind of proprietary interest to a performer in a particular role that he or she 
had become famous for playing.58 Referencing copyright law, Alarcon warned of creating a 
monopoly that would inhibit the creative expressions of others; as he pointed out, Samsung only 
copied “the idea of a glamorous female game show hostess,” and employed its own unique 
expression to portray that idea.59 Therefore, Alarcon would have affirmed the district court’s 
judgment, since Samsung did not appropriate either of White’s name or likeness.       
2. Kozinski’s Dissent from Refusal to Rehear En Banc 
 Following the unfavorable decision of the Ninth Circuit panel, Samsung petitioned the 
court for a rehearing en banc. Although the petition was denied, Circuit Judge Kozinski authored 
a powerful dissent that identified numerous flaws in the panel’s holding.60 Among other notable 
comments, Kozinski admonished:  
Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity 
is impossible without a rich public domain. Nothing today, likely nothing since 
we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science and technology, grows by 
accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who came before. 
Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it's supposed to nurture.61 
 Kozinski also reiterated some of what Alarcon had said in his dissenting opinion. 
Namely, that the “Wheel of Fortune” set—not the robot’s face, dress, or jewelry—is what 
evoked White’s image in the commercial.62 Therefore, the right granted to White by the Ninth 
Circuit panel was an exclusive right not in her image or persona, but in “what she does for a 
                                                          
58 Id. at 1405. 
59 Id. at 1408. 
60 White v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).  
61 Id. at 1513. 
62 Id. at 1515. 
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living.”63 Moreover, Kozinski considered the speech restriction imposed on Samsung to be 
“unparalleled” in First Amendment law, as it disallowed “reminding people of someone”—far 
beyond merely protecting White’s name or likeness—and he pondered why the court would 
allow White to “control our thoughts” in this manner.64 He warned that giving too much weight 
to performers’ right of publicity could allow them to veto fair use parodies and derivative works 
of the shows in which they appear.65 
 Kozinski’s dissent also attacked the panel’s dismissal of the First Amendment simply 
because Samsung’s speech was commercial. Scolding the panel’s complete failure to even 
mention, much less address, the Supreme Court’s Central Hudson commercial speech test, 
Kozinski advised that “[c]ommercial speech may be less protected by the First Amendment than 
noncommercial speech, but less protected means protected nonetheless.”66 Moreover, Kozinski 
pointed out that White, like Samsung, “does whatever she does to make money, too,” and posed 
the question of why White’s right to use her persona for profit should be superior to Samsung’s 
right to profit off its products.67    
III. Discussion 
 The expansive nature of the right of publicity has resulted in an encroachment upon 
advertisers’ First Amendment rights. Specifically, advertisers such as Duane Reade are now 
being sued for simply publishing truthful speech regarding a celebrity who actually uses the 
advertised product or service, because the celebrity has not given permission and the advertiser 
                                                          
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 1519. 
65 Id. at 1518. 
66 Id. at 1519. 
67 Id. at 1517. 
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has not given payment. However, the “value” associated with a celebrity’s name or reputation, 
economic or otherwise, should not be enough to outweigh an advertiser’s First Amendment right 
to truthful speech (as applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment), or the public’s 
interest in hearing such speech. Therefore, the right of publicity should not be a viable cause of 
action against an advertiser who appropriates a celebrity’s identity to promote a product, so long 
as the advertiser does not falsely imply that the celebrity endorses the product, as similarly 
required for false endorsement claims under the Lanham Act. 
A. Competing Interests 
 Taken at face value, neither of the competing interests at stake in a celebrity right of 
publicity action against an advertiser seems particularly compelling. On the one hand, an 
advertiser such as Duane Reade is typically seeking to capitalize on another’s success to sell a 
product, and on the other hand, a very wealthy celebrity such as Katherine Heigl is usually 
seeking an unimaginable sum of money; as Kozinski recognized in his White dissent, both are 
looking to make money. However, the advertiser’s interest should be recognized as the more 
compelling, even if only by a narrow margin. Specifically, the advertiser’s right to publish 
truthful information is grounded in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; as 
Kozinski also recognized, the mere fact that the advertiser’s speech is for a commercial purpose 
does not wholly deprive it of all protection—it merely requires application of the Central 
Hudson test. Moreover, a celebrity’s usage of a particular product may be the kind of 
information that consumers want to know prior to making a purchasing decision, and therefore 
ought to be part of the “free flow of commercial information” described in Virginia State Board. 
This is evident from the strong influence that paid endorsers can have over audiences, and the 
13
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high demand that they are in.68 Also, the C.B.C. court recognized the public’s interest in knowing 
“factual data.” These interests all outweigh the celebrity’s right to publicity, which stems from 
either state statute or state common law and, as seen in Haelan Laboratories, essentially exists 
merely to protect a pecuniary interest. The only “harm” alleged by celebrities like Katherine 
Heigl is strictly financial. 
 To properly determine whether a state has the ability to constitutionally regulate an 
advertiser’s commercial speech, such as by enjoining an advertiser from publishing that a 
celebrity uses its product or service, the regulation must be analyzed under the Central Hudson 
test. As previously stated, this test asks: (1) is the expression protected by the First Amendment; 
(2) is the asserted governmental interest substantial; (3) does the regulation directly advance the 
asserted governmental interest; and (4) is the regulation more extensive than necessary to serve 
that interest? 
 If the advertiser’s speech is truthful and accurately states that a particular celebrity uses 
its product or service, then the first prong is met. For example, Katherine Heigl did not deny that 
she actually shopped at Duane Reade, and so the advertisements were presumably entirely 
truthful (and certainly provided strong evidential support in the form of the photographs 
themselves). Notably, under Blackmun’s concurrence in Central Hudson, the analysis would be 
complete at this step and the issue would be resolved in favor of the advertiser.  
                                                          
68 See, e.g., Kate Middleton Causes Diane Von Furstenberg Wrap Dress To Sell Out In Minutes, The Huffington 
Post Canada, http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/04/16/kate-middleton-diane-von-
furstenberg_n_5163893.html?just_reloaded=1; and Jamie Feldman, Rihanna Gets Paid More For Attending A 
Fashion Show Than You Probably Make In One Year, The Huffington Post, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/21/rihanna-fashion-show-attendance-cost_n_5366775.html. 
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Nevertheless, moving on to the second prong, it is difficult to identify a government 
interest in a celebrity’s right of publicity action that is “substantial.” The C.B.C. court provided 
some guidance for this when it identified various potential justifications for the right of publicity, 
but none of those that apply to the truthful advertising context satisfy the substantial interest 
requirement. For example, this is not a case where the celebrity’s ability to earn a living might be 
interfered with; at most, the celebrity may suffer some loss from potential paid endorsements. 
But such loss would be inconsequential for substantially the same reason that the economic 
incentive of inducing achievement is irrelevant—because celebrities are already “handsomely 
compensated.” Moreover, truthfully advertising that a celebrity actually uses a product or service 
certainly does not create a concern of consumer deception (indeed, paid “endorsers” are more 
likely to cause such deception where they do not actually use the products they are selling). The 
most applicable justification identified in C.B.C. is the efficient allocation of resources to protect 
the commercial value of the celebrity’s likeness. Yet the C.B.C. court also recognized that “in the 
absence of publicity rights, celebrities would still be able to reap financial reward from 
authorized appearances and endorsements.”69  
Therefore, while a state may still have some “legitimate” interest in providing a celebrity 
with a right of publicity (under a less stringent standard), it seems highly questionable that this 
interest might be considered “substantial” enough to pass muster under Central Hudson. Without 
a substantial government interest, the remaining factors of Central Hudson cannot be satisfied. 
Moreover, echoing Justice Blackmun’s words in Virginia State Board, the “listener” has a strong 
interest in hearing the advertiser’s truthful speech. And, as C.B.C. recognized, the public has an 
                                                          
69 C.B.C., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1097 (internal quotations omitted). 
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interest in the dissemination of “news and information.”70 In short, the celebrity’s interest in 
reaping financial gains for supporting a product or service should not outweigh the advertiser’s 
First Amendment right to free speech and the public’s interest in hearing it.  
B. Right of Publicity Cases More Concerned with False Endorsement 
 Although characterized by the courts as “right of publicity” cases, many such cases have 
really turned on whether an advertisement created a false impression that a celebrity actually 
approved of, or endorsed, a particular product or service. For example, in Onassis the court 
found that the celebrity look-alike was so strikingly similar to Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis that 
an image of the look-alike legally constituted a “portrait or picture” of Onassis herself. 
Therefore, the impression created by the advertisement was that Onassis endorsed the advertised 
product—in fact, that she approved of the product so much that she was willing to lift her self-
imposed ban on commercial promotions to appear in an advertisement for it. The court even 
characterized the advertiser’s look-alike tactic as an attempt to find a loophole “if a person is 
unwilling to give his or her endorsement to help sell a product.”71 Similarly, the Midler decision 
turned on the fact that the sound-alike’s performance so closely resembled Bette Midler’s, again 
creating the impression that Midler herself endorsed the product when she had in fact declined to 
do so.  
 The court in Allen declined to decide the plaintiff’s right of publicity claim, resolving the 
issue instead in the context of a Lanham Act false endorsement claim, where the same relief was 
available under the less stringent standard of a “likelihood” of confusion. But before shifting its 
                                                          
70 While Katherine Heigl’s shopping habits may hardly seem to be newsworthy, it should be noted that the 
photographs posted by Duane Reade were originally published by a celebrity gossip news source. See Heigl v. 
Duane Reade, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-02502 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), ECF No. 2. 
71 Onassis, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 261. 
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analysis toward the Lanham Act, Allen clarified that the question under right of publicity is not 
whether people will be “reminded” of the celebrity, but whether an image shown in the 
advertisement should be regarded to “be” an image of the celebrity—in other words, whether 
viewers will actually believe that the celebrity himself is endorsing the product. This was the 
standard that the White court failed to apply. And, had the Kozinski and Alarcon opinions won 
the day in White, Samsung would have been permitted to continue running its commercial 
because it did not actually use Vanna White’s name or likeness; rather, it merely reminded 
viewers of her, devoid of any suggestion that White herself actually endorsed the Samsung 
products.    
C. Comparison to Defamation 
 It is worth noting the striking incongruity between the legal standards that a celebrity 
must satisfy when bringing a suit for defamation as opposed to a right of publicity infringement 
suit. In the defamation context, a celebrity or other public figure may only recover if he can 
prove that the defendant made a false statement about him, and that the false statement in 
question was made with “actual malice.”72 Historically, this can be a difficult standard to meet, 
as it requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant had either actual knowledge of the falsity or 
a reckless disregard for the truth.73 Notably, part of the reasoning behind applying such a 
heightened standard to public figures was that they are in a better position than private 
individuals to correct any falsehoods published about them by virtue of their access to the public 
forum, and that publishers ought to be protected from the undue fact-checking burden that they 
might otherwise endure.  
                                                          
72 See e.g., The New York Times Co. v. L.B. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280-281 (1964).  
73 Id.  
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 It seems strange, then, that a celebrity has a much easier case to make when suing 
someone—an advertiser—for publishing something entirely truthful and not at all defamatory. 
Suddenly, truthful information finds itself more heavily restricted than false information. And 
yet, much of the same rationale behind the actual malice standard still applies: the celebrity still 
has access to the public forum, and can correct, or at least respond to, any attempts by advertisers 
to use his name or likeness to promote a product. Moreover, the right of publicity would allow 
anyone else to make the same exact truthful representation about the celebrity in a non-
advertising context; it simply targets one particular group of speakers, advertisers, by virtue of 
the fact that they seek to make a profit—but so does the celebrity. Furthermore, while a celebrity 
might complain that he did not wish for the public to know of his use of a particular product or 
service for reasons other than pecuniary interests (perhaps out of fear that such knowledge might 
damage his reputation), a private individual or news outlet could be completely free to make that 
knowledge public;74 such an issue might be better suited for a right of privacy claim, anyway. 
IV. Conclusion 
 Celebrities like Katherine Heigl should not have a viable cause of action against 
advertisers like Duane Reade, who simply publicize truthful events to promote their brands. A 
celebrity’s right of publicity should only be considered infringed when an advertiser has 
misappropriated the celebrity’s name or likeness to create a false impression that the celebrity 
actually “endorses” its product or service. But when a celebrity actually does use a product, he 
cannot complain over the resulting impression that he approves of that product. And, if he truly 
wishes to be distanced from that product, he can find redress via his access to the public forum in 
                                                          
74 As previously mentioned, the Heigl photographs were already available via a celebrity gossip news source. See 
Katherine Heigl Signs with WME After Leaving Creative Artists Agency, Just Jared, 
http://www.justjared.com/photo-gallery/3073133/katherine-heigl-signs-with-wmeleaves-caa/02/. 
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the same manner as if he had actually been defamed. Truthful information that consumers may 
want to know should not be subject to restriction at the will of a celebrity’s financial interest; the 
First Amendment should not give way to Katherine Heigl’s hunt for more money.   
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